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Multiple behavioral rules 
a b s t r a c t 
We study intra-individual behavioral heterogeneity in an experimental Cournot oligopoly. 
Previous empirical results in this setting have demonstrated convergence to competitive 
outcomes, in agreement with theoretical predictions assuming that players imitate suc- 
cessful opponents. We postulate that players sometimes rely on imitation of successful 
behavior, and sometimes best reply to the actions of others. Testable predictions are ob- 
tained from a model allowing for multiple behavioral rules which accounts for differences 
in the cognitive nature of the underlying decision processes. Those include non-trivial re- 
sponse time interactions depending on whether the rules share a common prescription 
(alignment) or not (conflict), a classification which is ex ante observable. The results con- 
firm the hypotheses and support the presence of multiple behavioral rules at the individual 
level. 
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ) 
1. Introduction 
Imitation is pervasive in humans. It is well established that imitative behavior plays a fundamental role for human learn- 
ing ( Bandura, 1977 ). Humans actually overimitate , even when compared to chimpanzees ( Horner and Whiten, 2005 ), imitate 
gestures of others unwittingly ( Chartrand and Bargh, 1999 ), and imitate others even when it impairs task performance 
( Cracco et al., 2018 ). It has been argued that imitating successful others is also a common practice in markets, although the 
evidence is less direct. For instance, Williams and Miller (2002) conducted a cluster analysis of the decision-making styles 
of 1684 executives and showed that the most numerous group (“followers:” 36%) was described to “make decisions based 
on how they’ve made similar decisions in the past or how other trusted executives have made them.”
Imitative behavior would have important consequences for market outcomes. Vega-Redondo (1997) showed that, in dy- 
namic Cournot oligopolies, if market actors imitate quantities leading to the highest profits and make occasional mistakes, 
the long-run market outcome corresponds to the Walrasian equilibrium, and not to the Cournot-Nash one (see also the “im- 
itation equilibrium” of Selten and Ostmann, 2001 ). In this sense, imitation leads to more competitive outcomes than those 
predicted by standard game-theoretic concepts. This surprising result was generalized to the class of aggregative games by 
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Alós-Ferrer and Ania (2005) , and rests on the observation that, for payoff structures as that of a Cournot oligopoly and other 
games, imitative behavior systematically increases relative payoffs , as pointed out in earlier work by Schaffer (1988, 1989) , 
which can destabilize the Cournot-Nash equilibrium but not the Walrasian one. 
The result of Vega-Redondo (1997) motivated a series of experimental studies on Cournot oligopolies. Huck, Normann, 
Oechssler, 1999 and Offerman et al. (2002) conducted experiments with repeated interactions in Cournot triopolies and 
found more competitive outcomes when imitation is facilitated by providing information on individual actions and profits. 
In contrast, providing more information on the market structure, or restricting information to aggregate quantities, decreases 
competitiveness, as would be expected if behavior shifted toward (myopic) best-reply. Huck et al. (20 0 0) found similar re- 
sults in an experiment with differentiated-products oligopolies. In a different Cournot oligopoly experiment, Huck, Normann, 
Oechssler, 2002 suggest that the data would be consistent with a mixture of best reply and imitation. Convergence to Wal- 
rasian outcomes has been shown to be robust even under asymmetric costs, where the theoretical prediction does not 
generalize ( Apesteguía, Huck, Oechssler, Weidenholzer, 2010 ). 
Generally, experimental support for Walrasian outcomes as predicted by models of imitation seems to be stronger with 
larger numbers of participants per Cournot market. Huck et al. (2004) showed that experimental markets with four or 
more firms frequently become very competitive, while less competitive outcomes were observed for three or less firms. 
A few experiments have also examined Cournot oligopolies with very long horizons (1200 periods) and come to similar 
conclusions. Friedman et al. (2015) showed that duopolies and triopolies initially moved toward competitive outcomes, but 
participants gradually learned to coordinate on quantities near collusion. Oechssler et al. (2016) replicated this result for 
duopolies, but found quantities above the Cournot one for tetrapolies and concluded that “four remain many even with 
1200 periods.”1 
While compatible with the theoretical predictions of imitation models as Vega-Redondo (1997) , the experimental results 
above do not constitute a direct test of the actual presence of imitative behavior in Cournot oligopolies. Convergence to 
competitive outcomes is a joint implication of imitative behavior, a stochastic dynamics based on infrequent mistakes, and 
a focus on long-run outcomes. Thus, experiments showing such convergence demonstrate the (very relevant) prediction of 
increased competitiveness, but do not test imitative behavior in itself. In this work, we aim to provide more direct evidence 
on the use of imitation at the individual level, not relying on any convergence results. 
A first step to investigate the presence or prevalence of imitation is to concentrate on whether actual choices are compat- 
ible with the predictions of imitative rules or not. Obviously, this is an incomplete test, as a choice predicted by an imitative 
rule might also be predicted by an alternative rule as e.g. best reply. However, evidence on choices compatible with a 
behavioral rule is still highly informative. Apesteguía et al. (2007) conducted a Cournot triopoly experiment with random 
re-matching each period within pre-specified groups and treatments that differed on whether players were informed about 
the actions and profits of their competitors, or those of other players in the experiment. They evaluate behavioral rules on 
the number of individual decisions compatible with the rules’ predictions, and find that most subjects either repeat their 
previous choice, switch to the action with the highest-observed payoff, or adopt an action not observed in the last pe- 
riod. Strikingly, over 35% of their subjects switch to the action with the highest-observed payoffs in more than 60% of all 
decisions, and the percentage increases to 80% for about 10% of the players. 
An alternative way to demonstrate the relevance of imitation is to concentrate on the characteristics of this behavioral 
rule as a heuristic, and this is the avenue we will pursue. In particular, we will use the fact that imitation can be seen as a 
more intuitive behavioral rule when compared to other rules as myopic best reply, in terms of their cognitive characteristics. 
In this sense, our work is related to Bosch-Domènech, Vriend, 2003 , who attempted to show the presence of imitative be- 
havior in a Cournot oligopoly experiment. Their argument was that imitation should be more prevalent for more demanding 
environments because more sophisticated behavioral rules are then harder to apply. Thus, they used different treatments 
with different levels of complexity implemented through time limits and inconveniently-described payoff tables. The results 
showed no stronger reliance on imitation as complexity increased. In particular, aggregate quantities did not become closer 
to the Walrasian one (although they stayed above the Cournot one for all treatments). By analyzing the percentage of correct 
predictions at the individual level for different behavioral rules, Bosch-Domènech, Vriend, 2003 find that imitation rules do 
not describe behavior better as complexity increases. However, the same is true for best-reply rules, which leads the authors 
to conclude that the more demanding treatments increased player disorientation. 
A different approach following a conceptually-similar strategy was pursued by Buckert et al. (2017) . These authors con- 
ducted a Cournot triopoly experiment and used treatments where subjects were either placed under time pressure or dis- 
tracted by concurrent tasks, which induced higher levels of stress according to cortisol measurements. Subjects under time 
pressure made a larger percentage of choices consistent with imitation. 
In contrast to these works, our aim is to demonstrate that imitation coexists with other, more deliberative rules of be- 
havior along the lines of (myopic) best reply. That is, our hypothesis is that there is intra-individual heterogeneity in behavior. 
1 Other experiments have examined the role of imitation in different settings. Abbink, Brandts, 2008 carried out an experiment on Bertrand competition 
under convex costs and found evidence compatible with the presence of a heuristic based on imitation and experimentation, as modeled theoretically 
by Alós-Ferrer, Ania, Schenk-Hoppé, 20 0 0 . Offerman and Sonnemans (1998) found that people often imitated successful others (but also learned from 
their own experience) in an experiment on individual investment decisions. Offerman and Schotter (2009) conducted an experiment using both individual 
production tasks and take-over games, where participants could sample the actions and payoffs of others. They found behavior mostly compatible with 
imitation even when it had detrimental payoff consequences. 
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To show this, we borrow from models analyzing multiple behavioral rules and derive predictions which would not hold if a 
single behavioral rule was at work. In particular, we obtain testable predictions both when imitation and best reply prescribe 
different actions and when they do prescribe the same action, even though in the latter case choice data cannot distinguish 
the rules. That is, we will not exclusively rely on the percentage of choices consistent with imitation, but rather formulate 
more nuanced predictions. 
Specifically, we apply a “dual-process diffusion model” previously used to study decision process multiplicity in individ- 
ual, non-strategic, binary decisions ( Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer, 2014; Alós-Ferrer, 2018 ). We adapt this model to our setting 
(with non-binary decisions), but otherwise rely on the model structure as used in previous works. To derive testable pre- 
dictions, the model develops ideas from dual-process theories , which postulate that the human mind is mainly influenced 
by two kinds of processes, called automatic and controlled (see Kahneman, 2003; Alós-Ferrer and Strack, 2014 ; see also 
Evans, 2008 and Weber and Johnson, 2009 for detailed reviews). Automatic processes are fast, unconscious, and require few 
cognitive resources. They capture impulsive reactions and behavior along the lines of stimulus-response schemes. Controlled 
processes are slow, consume cognitive resources, and are reflected upon (partly) consciously. Although there is a clear anal- 
ogy between dual-process theories and the distinction between full and bounded rationality in the economic sciences, the 
key difference is that dual-process models assume heterogeneity within the individual. 
The model considers two different behavioral rules. As an alternative to imitation, we will focus on myopic best re- 
ply, that is, payoff maximization taking current information on other agents’ behavior as given. This is a natural choice for 
Cournot oligopolies, as it captures one-step strategic behavior and acts as a first-order proxy of deliberative thinking. Obvi- 
ously, however, this is a simplification, as it should be expected that more complex deliberative rules are used by at least 
some participants. 
We postulate that imitation is a more automatic rule, where individuals react to a more successful action and respond by 
imitating this action, while myopic best reply is a more deliberative rule which involves active maximization after consid- 
ering available information. This is confirmed by widespread evidence from cognitive psychology and neuroscience, which 
indicates that imitation learning displays the characteristics of automatic processes (for a meta analysis of 226 experiments 
see Cracco et al., 2018 ). For our purposes, the key observation is that imitation, as a boundedly-rational behavioral rule, can 
be expected to be more automatic than rules assuming explicit payoff maximization as myopic best reply. However, there are 
clear differences between our approach and research in cognitive psychology. First, the paradigm we focus on is far more 
complex than those typically encountered in that literature. Second, the behavioral rules we are interested in all involve 
cognitive aspects (as opposed to purely automatic reactions). That is, we do not postulate that imitation is an exclusively- 
automatic process as those studied in cognitive psychology, but merely that it is more automatic (or less deliberative) than 
myopic best reply. 
The latter point is particularly important. Dual-process theories often use the labels automatic (or intuitive) and con- 
trolled (or deliberative) in a dichotomous (“dual”) way for simplicity, but this is indeed just a simplification and not an 
accurate description of how differences among processes are viewed in psychology. Rather, the automaticity dimension is 
actually viewed as a continuum (e.g., Allport, 1954; Bargh, 1989; Cohen et al., 1990; Schneider and Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin 
and Schneider, 1977 ). Few processes are purely automatic or purely deliberative. In particular, many processes that are often 
informally described as “intuitive” are merely seen as less deliberative than others. For example, it would be incorrect to 
identify “deliberative” with “conscious,” especially since human beings notoriously overestimate to which extent their deci- 
sions reflect fully-conscious processes (e.g., Nisbett and Wilson, 1977 ). Our view is that the rules we consider here can be 
ordered with respect to each other in terms of automaticity, but not that one is fully conscious and the other is not, or that 
one is always fast and the other is always slow. Formally, we assume that imitation is less deliberative than myopic best 
reply, and derive predictions on the basis of that assumption, which we then proceed to test. Our empirical tests hence can 
be seen as delivering evidence consistent with the assumption that imitation is more automatic than myopic best reply. 
Our predictions focus on one of the most basic measures of process data, response times . Those are a standard tool in 
psychology and are now receiving increasing attention for the study of economic decisions ( Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer, 2014; 
Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016b; Alós-Ferrer and Buckenmaier, 2020; Alós-Ferrer and Ritschel, 2018; Moffatt, 2005; Rubinstein, 2007, 
2016; Spiliopoulos and Ortmann, 2018 ). The key insight allowing for testable predictions is that more automatic processes 
are faster than more deliberative ones, and hence response times can be used as a direct source of evidence for the in- 
volvement of different decision processes. This does not , however, mean that one can simply classify decisions in fast and 
slow according to some exogenous criterion and conclude that one kind of decisions is more automatic. This would be an 
example of the “reverse inference” fallacy ( Krajbich et al., 2015 ). The problem is that processes, and behavioral rules, are 
not directly observable. Hence, when observing a choice and its associated response time, we cannot know which process 
has generated them. Each process will result in a distribution of response times (and choices!). However, by exploiting the 
concepts of conflict and alignment among behavioral rules (i.e., whether they prescribe the same answer or different ones), 
our model avoids reverse inference while still allowing for specific, non-trivial predictions (on response times conditional 
on specific types of choices). 
The model delivers four kinds of predictions. First, whenever best reply and imitation are in conflict (make different 
prescriptions), choices where a best reply is selected are slower than when both rules are aligned (make the same pre- 
scription). Intuitively, this is because in case of conflict best replies come almost exclusively from the slower best reply rule, 
while in case of alignment the faster imitation rule also contributes a significant proportion of best replies. This is analogous 
to the well-established Stroop effect from cognitive psychology ( Stroop, 1935 ; see Section 2 ). Second, in case of conflict, best 
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replies are slower than imitative decisions, essentially because many of the latter arise from the faster imitation rule. Third, 
in contrast to the case of conflict (and somewhat counterintuitively), in case of alignment best replies are faster than other 
responses. This is because, in this case, the faster imitation rule contributes a large number of apparent best replies. That 
is, we obtain a testable prediction even in cases where the actual choices would be uninformative in order to disentangle 
the rules. Fourth, there are fewer best replies in case of conflict than in case of alignment. Also, there are fewer imitative 
choices in case of conflict than in case of alignment. This is simply because in case of alignment both behavioral rules favor 
a common prescription. None of the differences above would obtain if a single behavioral rule determined behavior. 
It is important to note that our assumptions are formulated in terms of the relative automaticity and hence average speed 
of the involved processes, following dual-process theories, but our predictions concern observable response times. That is, 
our predictions are not in terms of the response times of different processes, but rather in terms of the response times of 
different observable responses, conditional on the also-observable property of whether a decision corresponds to conflict or 
alignment. In particular, the predictions do not rely on any assignment of decisions to processes, as the latter would entail 
a reverse-inference fallacy as discussed above. We insist that decision processes are noisy, and we view them as stochastic 
behavioral rules. Thus, it is never possible to determine whether a particular choice originates from a particular decision 
process. The model we rely on avoids those problems by deriving testable predictions on observable response times on the 
basis of assumptions on the (unobservable) processes. 
In a laboratory experiment, we find clear evidence for all the predictions detailed above. The results suggest that multiple 
behavioral rules codetermine behavior in a complex strategic setting (Cournot oligopoly), with imitation of past success and 
myopic payoff maximization being the two main drivers of decisions. In particular, we explicitly reject that a single rule per 
individual explains behavior. This multiplicity occurs at the individual level, that is, behavioral heterogeneity starts within 
each single decision maker. 
It is worth mentioning that our analysis involves relatively long response times (typically 10 to 15 s), compared to most 
response-time studies in cognitive psychology. This is not surprising, since the task we study (as many relevant tasks in 
economics) is more complex than those typically used in that field. This is, however, no obstacle for our analysis. Obviously, 
if the differences in response times between more intuitive and more deliberative processes are large enough, effects will 
still be observed even if overall response times are long, and even if none of the processes is purely automatic (as discussed 
above). 2 Ultimately, whether those effects are large enough to be detected is an empirical question, which we answer in the 
affirmative. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the formal model and derives our predictions. 
Section 3 presents the experimental design and procedures, and describes the strategy of analysis. Section 4 discusses the 
results. Section 5 provides a complementary discussion on the possibility of disentangling different types of imitative de- 
cisions (imitating yourself vs. imitating others). Section 6 concludes. Proofs are relegated to the appendix. Experimental 
instructions and screenshots are in the Online Appendix. 
2. Predictions for multiple behavioral rules 
This section generalizes the model of Achtziger, Alós-Ferrer, 2014 and Alós-Ferrer (2018) , which was restricted to binary 
choice, to the multiple-alternative case. The model assumes that two behavioral rules codetermine behavior, a more deliber- 
ative one and a more intuitive/impulsive one, and is best conceived of as a model of (one-step) decisions in an experiment. 
For our purposes, we concentrate on myopic best reply and imitation. 3 
2.1. A simple formal model 
Consider a given decision in a (symmetric) Cournot oligopoly. Suppose that only finitely many options are available (as 
will be the case in the experiment), and denote by X the finite set of options (output levels), with typical element x ∈ X . 
There are N players, i = 1 , . . . , N, and the profits of player i are given by 







· x i −C(x i ) , 
where P : R → R is the (decreasing) inverse demand function and C : R → R is the common (increasing) cost function, and 
x −i = (x 1 , . . . , x i −1 , x i +1 , . . . , x n ) is the vector of output levels of i ’s opponents. 
The model considers a single (one-step) decision, for an arbitrary but fixed player i . This player has received information 
on the quantities currently produced and profits earned by all involved firms, x̄ = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and π̄ = (π1 , . . . , πn ) , with 
π j = π j (x j | x − j ) . This information, together with the structure of the game, allows to compute both the action which maxi- 
mizes payoffs given the actions of other players (myopic best reply) and to observe the action which has led to the largest 
2 As an extreme example, Alós-Ferrer et al. (2016a) study the responses to questions as in the Cognitive Reflection Test, with median response times 
typically above 30 seconds, and find differences depending on whether the questions elicited more or less intuitive responses. 
3 Achtziger, Alós-Ferrer, 2014 applied the model to reinforcement and Bayesian updating in a belief updating task. Spiliopoulos (2018) used the model to 
study win-stay, lose-shift vs. more sophisticated (cognitive) heuristics in a repeated game played against computer algorithms. Ludwig et al. (2020) applied 
it to heuristic decisions in probability judgments. 
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payoffs in the last interaction (imitative choice). Assume for simplicity that there are no ties (again, as will be the case in 
the experiment). Then, the myopic best reply x B is 
x B = arg max 
x ∈ X 
πi (x | x −i ) 
and the imitative choice x I is 
x I = x j such that j = arg max 
ℓ =1 , ... ,N 
πℓ 
where we drop all dependence on i for simplicity, as it will not be necessary for the analysis below. We will assume below 
that the myopic best reply rule is stochastic but favors x B above other options, and that the imitation rule similarly favors 
x I above other options. We speak of conflict if x B  = x I , that is, imitating the best observed payoffs would not result in a best 
reply, and we speak of alignment if x B = x I . 
Example 1. To fix ideas, suppose X = { 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 } and N = 4 players compete in a symmetric Cournot oligopoly with linear 
inverse demand function given by P (Q ) = 48 − Q, Q = x 1 + · · · + x 4 , and linear cost function C(x i ) = 8 x i , hence πi (x i | x −i ) = 
( 40 − Q ) x i . Consider player 1, and suppose current play is given by x 1 = 9 , x 2 = x 3 = 8 , and x 4 = 10 . Given x 2 + x 3 + x 4 = 
26 , player 1’s profits π1 (x 1 | x −1 ) = ( 14 − x 1 ) x 1 are maximized at x 1 = 7 , hence (for player 1) x 
B = 7 . However, given the 
current quantities, P (Q ) = 13 and actual profits are π1 = 45 , π2 = π3 = 40 , and π4 = 50 , hence player 4 reaches the largest 
observed profits and x I = x 4 = 10 . Since x 
B  = x I , this is a case of conflict. Suppose that current play was given by x 1 = 7 and 
x 2 = x 3 = x 4 = 8 instead. Then, π1 (x 1 | x −1 ) = ( 16 − x 1 ) x 1 is maximized at x 
B = 8 . Since P (Q ) = 17 , current profits are π1 = 63 
and π2 = π3 = π4 = 72 , hence x 
I = 8 = x B , yielding a case of alignment. 
Let BR and Im denote the myopic best reply and imitation rules, respectively. Which of the two rules will actually deter- 
mine behavior is a stochastic event. Let  > 0 be the probability that the actual response is selected according to imitation, 
and 1 −  the probability that it is selected according to myopic best reply. Moreover, we assume that all rules are stochas- 
tic in nature, i.e., they carry an amount of noise, resulting in errors (deviations from the rule’s prescription). 4 Note that, 
hence, myopic best reply can select x I and imitation can select x B even in case of conflict, and any of them could select 
actions x  = x B , x I . That is, in case of alignment ( x B = x I ) both behavioral rules tend to make the same prescription and in 
case of conflict ( x B  = x I ) they would make different prescriptions in the absence of noise, but due to behavioral noise they 
might actually select either option in either case, or a third, different one. 
Denote by P BR the probability with which the myopic best reply rule indeed selects the best reply x B , and by P Im the 
probability with which the imitation rule selects the alternative with the highest observed payoff, x I . That is, if P BR (x ) and 
P Im (x ) denote the probabilities with which each rule selects x ∈ X, conditional on the rule being the one which actually 
determines the response, then P BR = P BR (x B ) and P Im = P Im (x I ) . Our first assumption is as follows. 
(P1) For each decision situation, 
P BR > P BR (x ) ∀ x ∈ X, x  = x B and P Im > P Im (x ) ∀ x ∈ X, x  = x I . 
This is a minimal consistency condition which simply declares that the prescription of a rule is indeed the rule’s most 
frequent selection, but it is a rather mild one, since for the multi-alternative case it does not even imply that the prescription 
is selected more than half of the time. 
Response times are also assumed to be stochastic. Let R B = E[ RT | BR ] and R I = E[ RT | Im ] denote the expected response 
times conditional on the response being selected by the myopic best reply or the imitation rule, respectively. For simplicity, 
we assume that expected response times do not depend on the actually-selected response. Naturally, since imitation is 
thought to be more automatic, hence faster in expected terms , we assume 
(R) R B > R I . 
For some of the results below, we will further assume that 
(P2) P Im > P BR , 
i.e. the deliberation process behind best reply (computing the myopically optimal behavior using the actual payoff function) 
is noisier than the stimulus-response process behind imitation (copying the action with the largest observed payoff, which 
does not even require knowledge of the payoff function), while the latter is more consistent . This is natural since imitation 
is assumed to be more automatic (closer to a stimulus-response process). 
A simple way to think of the model is to conceive of the imitation rule as a swift cognitive shortcut, which selects the 
action with the largest observed payoff quickly and very frequently, while the myopic best reply rule is a slow, deliberative 
process which depends on actual computations and is hence less consistent. 
For the binary-choice case, the model in Achtziger, Alós-Ferrer, 2014 has been given a micro-foundation in Alós- 
Ferrer (2018) as the dual-process diffusion model or DPDM. In this model, the processes are instantiated as diffusion processes 
as in the drift-diffusion model (DDM) of Ratcliff (1978) and Ratcliff and Rouder (1998) , which has been recently further ana- 
lyzed by Fudenberg et al. (2018) and is standard in cognitive psychology and neuroscience (e.g. Shadlen and Shohamy, 2016 ). 
In this model, evidence accumulation (internal to the decision maker) is captured as a diffusion process with a trend μ and 
4 Formally, a rule is a bidimensional random variable assigning choices x ∈ X and response times t > 0 , conditional on each given ( ̄x , ̄π ) . 
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two barriers. Whether the process chooses an option or the other corresponds to whether the upper or the lower barrier 
is hit first. The response time is the time at which the first barrier is hit. Alós-Ferrer (2018) shows that, in the DPDM, as- 
sumptions (P1), (P2), and (R) are implied if one simply assumes that the drift rate of the more automatic process is larger 
in absolute value than the drift rate of the more deliberative process, capturing that the former is swifter than the latter. 
2.2. Predictions 
Since all our formal results translate directly into experimental hypotheses, we label them accordingly for convenience 
(H1, H2, etc). The first testable prediction of the model concerns the comparison of conflict and alignment. Recall that, by 
committing ex ante to which behavioral rules are of interest, we can identify situations of conflict and alignment before data 
collection. The first prediction states that the response time of best replies must be strictly larger in situations of conflict 
than in situations of alignment. Since this prediction arises exclusively from process multiplicity, it essentially constitutes a 
“smoking gun” test on the presence of multiple processes. 
Theorem 1. Under (P1) and (R), 
(H1) the expected response time of best replies in case of conflict is strictly longer than the expected response time of best replies 
in case of alignment. 
The intuition for Theorem 1 is as follows (all proofs are in the appendix). Independently of whether the decision problem 
corresponds to conflict or alignment, the best reply rule delivers the same proportion of best replies, which are relatively 
slow. In case of conflict, the imitation rule favors the imitative choice, which is not a best reply, and hence typically con- 
tributes relatively fewer (fast) best replies. In case of alignment, the imitation rule actually favors the best reply, and hence 
typically contributes relatively many (fast) best replies. Hence, one obtains faster best replies under alignment than under 
conflict. 
It is worth noticing that the prediction of Theorem 1 corresponds to the well-known “Stroop Effect” discussed in psy- 
chology ( Stroop, 1935; MacCleod, 1991 ), which describes a slow-down of (correct) responses when one is asked to name the 
color that a word is printed in but that word happens to name a different color (e.g., “Red” printed in blue) compared to 
when the word names the color it is printed in (e.g., the word “Red” printed in red). However, work in psychology typically 
assumes that this and similar response-times effects are due to central executive functions of the brain related to the detec- 
tion and resolution of conflict among elementary responses, which tax cognitive resources and require time ( Bargh, 1989; 
Baddeley et al., 2001 ), but enable the inhibition of automatic responses in case of conflict. The model presented here does 
not assume such a difference in response times and Theorem 1 holds in its absence; see, however, Section 2.3 below. 
The model also makes more nuanced predictions for the response times of best replies and other responses. Those 
amount to a non-trivial interaction between responses (best replies, imitative choices, or other alternatives) and cogni- 
tive situations (conflict or alignment). Specifically, best replies must be slower on average than imitative choices in case of 
conflict, but in case of alignment (where best replies are also imitative choices), they must be faster than other choices. 
This parallels the prediction of Achtziger, Alós-Ferrer, 2014 and Alós-Ferrer (2018) that in situations with normatively cor- 
rect answers errors are fast in case of conflict but slow in case of alignment. This asymmetry goes beyond simple informal 
statements that intuitive responses should be faster, which might hide a reverse inference fallacy ( Krajbich et al., 2015 ), and 
serves as a test of the basic structure of the model. The next result gathers the predictions. 
Theorem 2. Assume (R). 
(H2) Under (P1), in case of conflict, the expected response time of best replies is larger than the expected response time of 
imitative choices (choosing the alternative with highest observed payoff). 
(H3) Under (P2), in case of alignment, the expected response time of best replies is shorter than the expected response time of 
other choices. 
The intuition behind Theorem 2 is as follows. The (slow) best reply rule favors the best reply alternative and the (fast) 
imitation rule favors the imitative choice. Those two alternatives are different in case of conflict, and hence best replies end 
up being on average slower in this case. In case of alignment, the two alternatives coincide but by (P2) the fast imitative 
process contributes more of them than the best reply rule, hence in expected terms best replies end up being on average 
faster. In other words, in case of alignment, the imitation rule acts as a quick and efficient shortcut to identify the best reply 
while the more error-prone best reply rule contributes relatively more (slow) non-best-reply answers. Hence, conditional on 
a best reply not being observed, it is more likely that the response is generated by the slower best reply rule. 
Last, the model also makes predictions for the proportion of best replies and imitative choices comparing the cases of 
conflict and alignment, which we summarize in the following result. 
Theorem 3. Under (P1), 
(H4a) the proportion of best replies is strictly smaller in case of conflict than in case of alignment, and 
(H4b) the proportion of imitative choices is strictly smaller in case of conflict than in case of alignment (when they are also best 
replies). 
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The intuition for Theorem 3 is immediate. In case of alignment, both behavioral rules favor the same option, in the sense 
of being the one selected most often. That option is simultaneously a best reply and an imitative choice. In case of conflict, 
the myopic best reply rule still favors best replies, but the imitation rule now favors a different option, which is imitative 
but not a best reply. Even though each rule might still select the option favored by the other rule in case of conflict, it does 
so less often. Hence, in case of alignment the common prescription obtains more often than any of the individual choices 
in case of conflict. 
All predictions above are in terms of inequalities. It is immediate that, if only one behavioral rule was present, none of 
those would obtain. In our empirical analysis, (H1)–(H4b) are treated as hypotheses, hence the corresponding null hypothe- 
ses (equalities) are the ones that would result under one behavioral rule only. In this sense, confirming our predictions rests 
on the rejection of those null hypotheses, and thus we will interpret the results below as evidence for the multiplicity of 
behavioral rules. 
2.3. Model extension 
The “Stroop Effect” generalized in Theorem 1 is usually attributed to time-consuming central executive functions neces- 
sary for the detection and resolution of conflict among different responses or processes ( Bargh, 1989; Baddeley et al., 2001 ), 
and which have been linked to early activity in the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (see, e.g., Achtziger et al., 2014; De Neys et al., 
2008; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2003 ). Theorem 1 predicts the effect without assuming such differences between conflict and 
alignment. However, it is easy to show that all results described above hold in an extended model incorporating the effects 
of conflict detection and resolution. Specifically, add a “non-decision time” to the response time which depends on conflict 
vs. alignment, t C or t A , respectively. The assumption mentioned above amounts to t C ≥ t A . At the same time, since conflict 
detection enables the inhibition of automatic responses, an extended model should distinguish the probability of the lat- 
ter depending on conflict or alignment. Thus, replace  with C or A for conflict or alignment, respectively, and assume 
C ≤ A . The previous model is encompassed by setting t C = t A and C = A . It is easy to see that all our results hold in 
the model extended in this way. For instance, the generalized Stroop effect still holds because the difference in non-decision 
time goes in the same direction as the one found in Theorem 1 . 
This extension, however, disciplines the model in sensible ways. For instance, an analogous proof to that of 
Theorem 1 shows that the expected response time of imitative choices in case of conflict is strictly shorter than the ex- 
pected response time of best replies (which are also imitative choices) in case of alignment. However, this prediction does 
not necessarily hold in the extended model, since non-decision times are longer in case of conflict and hence the compari- 
son of total response times would be undetermined. It is for this reason that we do not consider this additional, non-robust 
prediction. 
3. The experiment 
3.1. Experimental design and procedures 
In our experiment, participants interacted in 4-player Cournot oligopolies (tetrapolies). We made this choice because 
previous results have shown that convergence to Walrasian outcomes, which is compatible with imitative behavior, occurs 
more frequently with tetrapolies than with triopolies ( Huck et al., 2004; Oechssler et al., 2016 ). We conducted four sessions 
with 32 participants each for a total of N = 128 (82 females; median age 22 years) at the Cologne Laboratory for Eco- 
nomic Research (CLER). The experiment was programmed with z-Tree ( Fischbacher, 2007 ) and participants were recruited 
using ORSEE ( Greiner, 2015 ). We excluded students majoring in economics, psychology, and business, as they might have 
been taught game-theoretic concepts which might influence their behavior. A session lasted around 90 minutes and average 
earnings were 13.59 EUR, including a show-up fee of 2.50 EUR. 
Each participant competed in three different Cournot oligopolies (parts), which lasted for 17 periods each. Initially, play- 
ers were matched in groups of four to play the first tetrapoly (Part 1). After 17 periods, players were rematched in new 
groups of four and the oligopoly payoffs (demand function) were changed (Part 2). After 17 further periods, players were 
rematched again and played a third oligopoly with new payoffs (Part 3). To increase the number of fully-independent obser- 
vations, rematching was done within 16 pre-determined blocks of 8 participants each. Identities within a part were always 
anonymous and could not be traced back to previous parts. In each new part, at least two players in the group were different 
from the previous group. The sequence of the different oligopolies was varied across sessions. 
The three parts were implemented because, in contrast to previous experiments (e.g., Huck et al., 1999; Offerman et al., 
2002 ), we are interested in behavioral correlates of individual actions, rather than on eventual convergence. If and when 
convergence occurs, there is no further variance in the behavioral (choice) data, and response times become meaningless 
as participants mechanically repeat a fixed action. Hence, we were interested in data before convergence occurred. Thus, to 
maximize usable data, we implemented three parts (oligopolies) with rematching of participants, reassignment of identities, 
and changed payoff tables (computed with different demand functions). By the same reasoning data would be meaningless 
if and when collusion occurred. Rematching, working with shorter oligopolies, and changing payoff tables across parts also 
diminish the likelihood of collusion and increase the variance in behavioral data. 
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Each oligopoly was implemented through a payoff table (similarly to treatments in Bosch-Domènech, Vriend, 2003 and 
Apesteguía et al., 2007 ) derived from a linear inverse demand function of the form P (Q ) = a − Q, where P is the price, a the 
saturated demand, Q the total quantity in the market, and constant marginal costs, normalized to zero. A neutral framing 
was used and neither firms nor quantities were mentioned. We reduced the action space to four possible actions ( A, B, C, 
and D ). To further decrease the likelihood of fast convergence, the ordering of the quantities ( A to D ) changed with each part, 
that is, in some parts the assignment of quantities to letters was increasing and in some it was decreasing. 5 The second and 
third parts always had a different payoff table and a reversed ordering of the quantities with respect to the previous part. 
Hence, in each part, the game is given by a 4 × 4 × 4 × 4 payoff table, which by symmetry can be reduced to a 4 × 20 table, 
with four rows for the possible actions and 20 columns (labeled AAA to DDD ) for the opponents’ actions (independently of 
their identity). We discretized the action space to make the postulated behavioral rules (myopic best reply and imitation) 
both feasible and comparable. A continuous- or large-action space would have turned myopic best reply into an abstract 
maximization problem, while imitation would remain a discrete, intuitive rule. By choosing a discrete setup we go against 
our hypotheses and reduce the conceptual distance between the two behavioral rules. 
Payoffs were expressed in points (rounded to the nearest integer), with an exchange rate of 18 Eurocents per 10 0 0 points. 
The payoff table was permanently visible in the upper part of the screen during the corresponding part of the experiment. 
Example screenshots and instructions are presented in the (Online) Appendix. 6 The points achieved in all 51 rounds were 
accumulated and paid at the end of the experiment. Following the standard procedure in Cournot oligopoly experiments 
(e.g., Apesteguía et al., 2007, 2010; Huck et al., 1999; Offerman et al., 2002 ), all decisions were paid. There are two reasons 
for this choice. First, this is a dynamic setting with feedback in which the repeated rounds are not independent of each other. 
Second, the possibility of imitation was an essential aspect of the design. We wanted to emphasize that the other players 
did in fact earn a certain amount. An alternative would have been to pay only one round at the end of the experiment, but 
this would raise the concern that imitation might not be triggered. 
In order to focus on the interaction between myopic best reply and imitation, we highlighted the information required to 
implement both rules. Myopic best reply implements maximization within the column corresponding to the actual actions 
of the opponents in the previous period. For all rounds except the first one within each part, that column was highlighted. 
Thus, determining a myopic best reply required comparing four numbers only. For each round except the first, participants 
were also given feedback on the actions and profits of the group members in the previous period, making imitation feasible. 
As a robustness control, to make sure that presentation effects were minimized, we included two treatments which differed 
only on how that information was presented. In Treatment FullInfo , the choices and points of all other group members 
were presented in separate boxes, in addition to a box displaying the own choice and received points, and the box with the 
highest point amount was highlighted (as in the more demanding treatments in Bosch-Domènech, Vriend, 2003 ). This design 
choice was made to eliminate mechanical differences between imitation and myopic best reply and make both behavioral 
rules equally salient. Please note that, since we assume that imitation is a more automatic behavioral rule than best reply 
(and our predictions crucially hinge on this assumption), this choice works against our hypotheses, since the only remaining 
differences among the rules are of cognitive nature. In Treatment BestOnly only the own choice and points plus an additional 
(highlighted) box were shown, with the latter displaying the choice with the largest amount of points in the previous round 
(and the corresponding points). Note that in the FullInfo treatment both imitation and myopic best reply involve comparing 
four numerical quantities, making the mechanical aspects of the rules as comparable as possible. In contrast, the BestOnly 
treatment closely reproduces the idea of “imitate the best” as described, e.g., by Vega-Redondo (1997) , i.e. choosing the 
action with the highest profit in the previous round. The treatments were implemented between subjects, with half the 
subjects in each treatment in every session. As we will see below, results are not affected by the differences in information 
presentation. 
3.2. Classification of decisions and strategy of analysis 
The data set of our experiment consists of 128 × 48 = 6144 observations. The first decision within each part is always 
excluded since for that period there is no feedback concerning previous actions and the behavioral rules considered make 
no prescriptions. 
Given the previous actions of all four players, the identification of the prescriptions of the different behavioral rules 
is straightforward. Table 1 displays the prescriptions of myopic best reply and imitation in the experiment, for the case 
of decreasing assignment of quantities to letters. 7 Those prescriptions were identical for all three payoff tables. That is, 
the table shows the prescription of each behavioral rule when a specific combination of one’s own choice (row) and the 
choice of the other players (column) occurred in the previous round. Whenever myopic best reply is in alignment with 
imitation (that is, both prescribe the same action), the corresponding cells are shaded in gray. Hence, unshaded entries 
indicate conflict between myopic best reply and imitation. 
5 Payoff table 1: P(Q ) = 150 − Q, A = 37 . 5 , B = 33 . 25 , C = 30 , D = 18 . 75 (or reversed); Payoff table 2: P(Q ) = 175 − Q, A = 43 . 75 , B = 38 . 875 , C = 35 , 
D = 21 . 875 (or reversed); Payoff table 3: P(Q ) = 200 − Q, A = 50 , B = 44 . 5 , C = 40 , D = 25 (or reversed). 
6 Participants were asked to make a decision within 30 seconds. After that time, a request to make the decision appeared in a screen’s corner. Only 162 
out of 6,144 decisions ( 2 . 64% ) were made after 30 seconds. 
7 For the analysis of the data, the case of increasing assignment of quantities was simply recoded. 
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Table 1 
Overview of Prescribed Actions. 
Notes: Overview of prescribed actions for each behavioral rule depending on last period’s outcome. Cell 
entries describe the action prescribed by myopic best reply (BR) and imitation (Im) when the player 
previously chose the action given in the row and the opponents chose the actions given in the column. 
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Fig. 1. Myopic Best Reply vs. Imitation, Log-transformed Individual Ratios. Frequency distribution of log-transformed myopic best reply/imitation ratios per 
subject in case of conflict and fitted normal density function. The left and right dashed lines represent the 1-to-3 and 3-to-1 ratios, respectively. 
Given Table 1 , for periods 2–17 within each part, we can classify each actual decision of each participant according to 
the prescriptions (favored options) of the myopic best reply and imitation. As was to be expected, the majority of the 6144 
decisions were made in conflict situations (5010; 81.54%). Of those, 26.57, 31.64, and 41.80% were myopic best replies, im- 
itative decisions, or other choices, respectively. However, there were enough decisions made in case of alignment (1134; 
18.46%) to enable a meaningful analysis. Of those, 34.13% were myopic best replies (and hence also imitative). Although 
the proportion of other choices is relatively large, recall that we explicitly consider noisy behavioral rules, that is, following 
imitation or best reply does not necessarily mean that the imitative choice or the actual best reply are always selected. 
For instance, in conflict situations, in our four-alternative setting, there are always two alternatives which are favored by 
neither myopic best reply nor imitation; since behavioral rules are stochastic, those can actually be selected by either rule. 
Alternatively, this large proportion might suggest the presence of other rules (see Section 5 ) or point at some confusion 
( Bosch-Domènech, Vriend, 2003 ) or exploration behavior (see Section 4 ). We remark that the latter two factors might be 
more relevant in our data compared to other experiments because we excluded students of economics, business, and psy- 
chology. 
It is natural to ask whether all subjects relied on best reply and imitation with similar intensity, or whether there was 
heterogeneity among subjects (i.e., subjects relying predominantly on only one of the rules). Fig. 1 displays a histogram of 
the (log-transformed) individual ratios of myopic best replies vs. imitative choices, for the case of conflict (obviously, the 
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exercise is not feasible in case of alignment, since then choice data cannot disentangle the rules). That is, 0 corresponds to 
subjects who chose an equal proportion of myopic best replies and imitative choices in conflict situations. Values below 0 
correspond to subjects with a larger proportion of imitative decisions than myopic best replies, and vice versa for values 
above 0. The two dashed lines represent the 1-to-3 and 3-to-1 ratios. Around 78% of subjects lie between these ratios, 
indicating that most subjects do not predominantly rely on only one rule, in agreement with our assumptions. The figure 
also reveals a slight left-skewness, which suggest a somewhat higher reliance on imitation than on best reply and agrees 
with the descriptive statistics reported above. 
In order to test our hypotheses, we will initially conduct non-parametric tests. For instance, we can test whether deci- 
sions compatible with one behavioral rule are faster than those compatible with another decision rule, conditional, e.g., on 
conflict among the rules (Hypotheses H2, H3). To do so, we look at all situations where the two rules conflict and build 
two sets of decisions for each individual, those where the prescription of the first rule was followed, and those where the 
prescription of the second rule was followed. Then we apply the appropriate test (in this case, a Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test). 
For the analysis we consider the matching block the appropriate unit of observation, i.e. observations of all subjects who 
interacted anonymously with each other throughout all 3 parts are pooled into one observation. Since participants were 
separated into N = 16 different blocks (8 in each treatment) and were rematched only within those blocks, this guaran- 
tees completely independent observations. For each block, we compute the relative frequencies of choices and the average 
response times when following a given behavioral rule, conditional on conflict or alignment of myopic best reply and imi- 
tation. 8 
Before proceeding to the main analysis, we comment on the informational treatments. Those served as a robustness 
check to ensure that mere presentational effects, as salience of the maximum observed payoffs, did not significantly affect 
response times or drive behavior toward imitation. A block of 8 participants made on average 125.13 imitation decisions 
in the BestOnly treatment and 121.38 in the FullInfo treatment, which was not significantly different according to a Mann- 
Whitney- Wilco xon (MWW) test ( N = 16 , z = 0 . 735 , p = . 4622 ). The average response time of imitation decisions was 10.38 s 
in the BestOnly treatment and 10.36 s in the FullInfo treatment (MWW, N = 16 , z = 0 . 210 , p = . 8336 ). There were also no 
differences for myopic best replies. Hence, for the remainder of the analysis we will pool the data of both treatments. 
4. Results 
Fig. 2 illustrates the tests of all our predictions. Average response times are shown on the left-hand side, and choice 
frequencies on the right-hand side. We now discuss all predictions as depicted in the figure, reporting the corresponding 
non-parametric tests (a regression analysis is discussed below). Note that our hypotheses yield specific directional predic- 
tions which would allow us to rely on one-sided p-values. However, we will conservatively report two-sided p-values. 
Prediction (H1) serves as a first test of the presence of several, distinct behavioral rules. Myopic best replies, the prescrip- 
tion of the more deliberative behavioral rule, should be slower in case of conflict with imitation than in case of alignment. 
This corresponds to the comparison between the average response times of best replies in conflict and in alignment in Fig. 2 . 
The prediction is confirmed by the data: myopic best replies are slower in conflict (mean 12.38 s) than in alignment (mean 
10.46 s), with the differences being highly significant according to a Wilcoxon-Signed-Rank (WSR) test ( N = 16 , z = 2 . 947 , 
p = . 0032 ). 
Predictions (H2) and (H3) constitute a test of the nature of the involved processes and of the dual-process structure 
of the interaction. Essentially, myopic best replies should be relatively slow in case of conflict but relatively fast in case 
of alignment. Specifically, (H2) states that myopic best replies are slower than imitation decisions in conflict situations. 
As predicted, myopic best reply decisions are slower (average 12.38 s) than imitative choices (average 10.36 s) when the 
processes make different prescriptions, confirming the relatively more automatic nature of imitation decisions (compare 
the two left-most bars in the left-hand side of Fig. 2 ). The difference is highly significant according to a WSR test ( N = 16 , 
z = 3 . 361 , p = . 0 0 08 ). (H3) states that in case of alignment, myopic best replies (which are also imitative in this case) should 
be faster than other decisions. As predicted, myopic best replies (average 10.46 s) are significantly faster than other decisions 
(average 13.63 s; WSR, N = 16 , z = −3 . 258 , p = . 0011 ). 
The remaining two hypotheses concern relative choice frequencies. (H4a) states that myopic best replies should be less 
frequent under conflict than under alignment (when they are also imitative choices). This is illustrated in the right-hand side 
of Fig. 2 . In case of conflict, participants chose myopic best replies, on average, 26.57% of the time (average of individual 
averages), compared to 34 . 27% in case of alignment. The difference is highly significant (WSR test, N = 16 , z = −2 . 947 , 
p = . 0032 ). (H4b) states that, in contrast, imitative decisions should be less frequent under conflict than under alignment 
(when they are also best replies). This is indeed the case, with an average of 31.59% of imitative decisions in case of conflict 
8 A case can be made for individual observations as the appropriate unit of analysis. Following the logic of stochastic evolutionary models ( Blume, 1993; 
Kandori et al., 1993; Vega-Redondo, 1997; Alós-Ferrer and Ania, 2005 ), behavioral rules have a Markovian structure, i.e. they are mappings from information 
(outputs and profits in last period) to actions. Under this assumption, how exactly the input of the behavioral rule is generated is irrelevant. Hence, the 
fact that participants were part of tetrapolies which themselves were subgroups of certain blocks plays no role, for we are testing relative frequencies and 
response times which are generated after observation of the input, and tests condition on the relevant categories of inputs. Our conclusions were unchanged 
when conducting tests using subject averages instead of block averages (considering only those average response times with at least two observations per 
individual). 
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Fig. 2. Average Response Times and Choice Frequencies. Left-hand side: Average response times of imitative choices (Im), myopic best replies (BR), and 
other choices conditional on conflict and alignment. Right-hand side: Relative frequency of imitative choices and myopic best replies conditional on conflict 
and alignment. Stars indicate the significance of Wilcoxon Signed-Rank tests. ⋆ p < . 1 , ⋆⋆ p < . 05 , ⋆⋆⋆ p < . 01 . 
Table 2 
Random Effects Panel (Model 1–3) and Mixed Effects (Model 4) Regressions on (log) 
Response Times. 
ln(ResponseTime) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Conflict 0.1154 ∗∗∗ 0.1418 ∗∗∗ 0.1431 ∗∗∗ 0.1512 ∗∗∗
(0.0360) (0.0327) (0.0329) (0.0325) 
Imitation-Conflict −0.1809 ∗∗∗ −0.1510 ∗∗∗ −0.1517 ∗∗∗ −0.1352 ∗∗∗
(0.0307) (0.0255) (0.0255) (0.0244) 
Other 0.1794 ∗∗∗ 0.1735 ∗∗∗ 0.1748 ∗∗∗ 0.1859 ∗∗∗
(0.0424) (0.0369) (0.0370) (0.0366) 
Other ×Conflict −0.1808 ∗∗∗ −0.1868 ∗∗∗ −0.1879 ∗∗∗ −0.1953 ∗∗∗
(0.0406) (0.0354) (0.0355) (0.0350) 
FullInfo Treatment −0.0210 −0.0366 −0.0308 −0.0274 
(0.0559) (0.0570) (0.0517) (0.0530) 
Collusion −0.2405 ∗∗∗ −0.2005 ∗∗∗ −0.0905 ∗
(0.0525) (0.0513) (0.0525) 
Constant 2.2418 ∗∗∗ 2.6385 ∗∗∗ 2.3426 ∗∗∗ 2.3263 ∗∗∗
(0.0646) (0.0579) (0.1495) (0.1444) 
Controls No Yes Yes Yes 
Demographics No No Yes Yes 
Mixed Effects No No No Yes 
R 2 0.0313 0.1327 0.1587 0.1576 
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0 . 1 , ∗∗ p < 0 . 05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0 . 01 
and 34 . 27% in case of alignment, although the difference is not significant with our two-tailed tests (WSR test, N = 16 , 
z = −1 . 344 , p = . 1788 ). We remark, however, that one group successfully colluded during the last part of the experiment. 
When excluding the corresponding block observation, we observe less imitative decisions in conflict (average 30 . 97% ) than 
in alignment ( 34 . 64% ; two-tailed WSR test, N = 15 , z = −1 . 874 , p = . 0609 ). All previous conclusions regarding (H1-H4a) 
remain unchanged when excluding the block containing the colluding group. 
In summary, simple non-parametric tests already confirm our predictions. Hence, our experimental evidence is compat- 
ible with the interpretation that multiple behavioral rules, i.e. myopic best reply and imitation, codetermine behavior in 
complex Cournot oligopolies. We view this as a demonstration that complex economic decisions result from the interaction 
of multiple behavioral rules within individual economic agents. 
We now turn to a more detailed regression analysis. Our data forms a perfectly-balanced panel with 48 decisions for each 
of the 128 participants (total N = 128 × 48 = 6144 ). Table 2 reports random effects panel regressions on log-transformed 
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response times. 9 We (conservatively) cluster standard errors at the block level. Since our hypotheses hinge on the distinction 
between conflict and alignment, it is important to introduce the appropriate categories in the analysis. The Conflict dummy 
takes the value 1 when the decision corresponds to a case of conflict between myopic best reply and imitation. To avoid 
having to rely on post hoc tests, we further include the dummy Imitation-Conflict which only considers cases where the 
imitative choice was selected in conflict situations. 10 Last, the dummy Other takes the value 1 for choices which are neither 
imitative nor best replies. Thus, the interaction Other ×Conflict indicates choices which are neither imitative nor myopic best 
replies in case of conflict. Note that the reference group consists of decisions in case of alignment where the myopic best 
reply (which is also an imitative choice in this case) was selected. 
With this choice of dummies, all our response-times hypotheses can be tested directly in the regressions. Model 1 in 
Table 2 tests for the basic effects. Models 2 and 3 add further Controls and Demographics 11 to show that the results are 
robust. All models include a treatment dummy for the presentation variants, which is never significant. Models 2 and 3 
also add a Collusion dummy, taking the value 1 when the subject colluded with other subjects in a Cournot oligopoly. 
That coefficient is negative and highly significant, showing that the individuals who colluded were, unsurprisingly, fast. The 
inclusion of that dummy, however, does not affect other results. 
(H1) states that best replies should be slower in case of conflict than in case of alignment. The comparison corresponds 
to the coefficient for Conflict, which is indeed positive and highly significant ( p = . 0013 in Model 1, p < . 0 0 01 in Models 
2 and 3). (H2) predicts that myopic best replies should be slower than imitative choices, a comparison captured by the 
coefficient for the dummy Imitation-Conflict. The prediction is borne by the data, with the coefficient being negative and 
highly significant ( p < . 0 0 01 in all models). (H3) predicts that, in case of alignment, best replies should be faster than 
other responses. The comparison reduces to the coefficient for the Other dummy, which is highly-significant and positive as 
expected ( p < . 0 0 01 in all models). 
The regressions also allow us to examine a number of exploratory questions. The linear combination of the coefficients 
Other and Other ×Conflict is not significantly different from zero, i.e. in case of conflict we find no differences in response 
times between myopic best replies and other kinds of non-imitative decisions. In contrast, a linear combination test reveals 
that imitative decisions are significantly faster than other kinds of non-best-replies in conflict situations ( p < . 0 0 01 in all 
models). This suggests that this latter category might include choices reflecting higher-level deliberation processes or more 
complex behavioral rules, as e.g. level- k considerations (best-replying to the anticipated best reply of others, etc; see Alós- 
Ferrer and Buckenmaier, 2020 ). On the other hand, the proportion of Other decisions was significantly higher during the 
first part (45.36%) compared to the second (39.82%; WSR, N = 128; z = 2 . 699 , p = . 0069 ) and third parts (40.25%; z = 2 . 453 , 
p = . 0142 ), 12 which suggests that a fraction of the Other choices might have been due to early exploration during the first 
rounds. 
Model 4 presents an additional, hierarchical linear model estimating a mixed-effects regression with random intercept 
and random coefficients at the subject level (further clustered at the block level) for the three dummies of interest, i.e. 
Conflict, Imitation-Conflict, and Other (and Other × Conflict). 13 At the aggregate level, all our previous conclusions are sup- 
ported. However, this regression model allows for heterogeneity at the individual level with respect to the effects of interest. 
That is, we can estimate the individual random coefficient for each hypothesis. Fig. 3 displays the cumulative density distri- 
bution of each of the three coefficients of interest and shows that our hypotheses are overwhelmingly supported also at the 
individual level. Specifically, all 128 subjects (100%) exhibit a positive Conflict coefficient, in support of H1 (actually, there is 
little heterogeneity in this coefficient). Also, all 128 subjects (100%) exhibit a positive Other coefficient, supporting H3. Last, 
118 of the 128 subjects (92.19%) exhibit negative coefficients for Imitation-Conflict, in support of H2. 
Tables 3 and 4 provide probit panel regressions with myopic best replies and imitative choices as dependent variables, 
respectively. Standard errors are again clustered at the block level. The independent variables are the Conflict dummy, a 
treatment dummy, a Collusion dummy, and further Controls and Demographics as in the previous regression models. 
Table 3 allows us to parametrically test for Hypothesis (H4a), i.e. the prediction that myopic best replies are less likely 
under conflict than under alignment. This is confirmed by the negative and highly significant Conflict dummy, which is ro- 
bust to the addition of Controls and Demographics (Model 1, p = . 0 0 01 ; Models 2 and 3, p = . 0 0 02 ). Analogously, Table 4 al- 
lows us to test for Hypothesis (H4b), i.e. the prediction that imitative choices are also less likely under conflict than under 
alignment. Although present in the data, this trend is clearly less strong than other predictions. The Conflict dummy is not 
significant in Model 1 ( p = . 3184 ), which does not control for collusion. The coefficient still misses significance in Model 2 
( p = . 1087 ) and becomes only weakly significant in Model 3 ( p = . 0951 ), after adding Controls, Demographics, and the Col- 
lusion dummy. As an additional exercise, we also ran an ordered probit panel regression (similar to Model 4 of Huck, Nor- 
9 Response times are naturally bounded below by zero and usually present a skewed, non-normal distribution. To account for these features it is common 
practice to use a logarithmic transformation ( Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer, 2014; Fischbacher et al., 2013 ). See the Online Appendix for descriptive statistics of 
the response times. 
10 That is, the dummy takes the value 1 for imitative choices in case of conflict, and zero otherwise. Note that, since in case of alignment imitative choices 
are also best replies, this does not correspond to an interaction in the usual sense of the word. 
11 Controls consist of a measure for normalized rounds, part 2 and part 3 dummies, and two payoff table dummies for possible medium or high payoffs. 
Demographics consist of age, gender, and an indicator capturing whether the subjects reported attending a game theory class. 
12 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this test. 
13 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this additional analysis. 
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Fig. 3. Cumulative Density Function of Random Coefficients from Mixed-effects Regression. 
Table 3 
Panel Probit Regression Models for Myopic Best Reply. 
Myopic Best Reply Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Conflict −0.2183 ∗∗∗ −0.2163 ∗∗∗ −0.2158 ∗∗∗
(0.0567) (0.0573) (0.0574) 
FullInfo Treatment −0.0159 −0.0258 −0.0294 
(0.0413) (0.0409) (0.0461) 
Collusion −0.1815 ∗∗∗ −0.1573 ∗∗∗
(0.0125) (0.0330) 
Constant −0.4092 ∗∗∗ −0.3704 ∗∗∗ −0.4225 ∗∗
(0.0639) (0.0620) (0.1862) 
Controls No Yes Yes 
Demographics No No Yes 
Log Pseudolikelihood −3612.3172 −3603.9443 −3603.3104 
AME(Conflict) −0.0728 ∗∗∗ −0.0719 ∗∗∗ −0.0717 ∗∗∗
(0.0193) (0.0194) (0.0194) 
Standard errors, clustered by 16 matching blocks, in parentheses. 
AME = Average Marginal Effect. ∗ p < 0 . 1 , ∗∗ p < 0 . 05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0 . 01 
Table 4 
Panel Probit Regression Models for Imitation. 
Imitation Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Conflict −0.0542 −0.0754 −0.0749 ∗
(0.0543) (0.0470) (0.0449) 
FullInfo Treatment -0.0159 0.0282 0.0120 
(0.0752) (0.0802) (0.0739) 
Collusion 0.6844 ∗∗∗ 0.8105 ∗∗∗
(0.2523) (0.1552) 
Constant −0.4557 ∗∗∗ −0.7209 ∗∗∗ −1.2212 ∗∗∗
(0.0794) (0.1323) (0.1187) 
Controls No Yes Yes 
Demographics No No Yes 
Log Pseudolikelihood −3622.6196 −3601.3666 −3596.3697 
AME(Conflict) −0.0190 −0.0261 −0.0258 ∗
(0.0191) (0.0166) (0.0157) 
Standard errors, clustered by 16 matching blocks, in parentheses. 
AME = Average Marginal Effect. ∗ p < 0 . 1 , ∗∗ p < 0 . 05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0 . 01 
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Fig. 4. Average Response Times of Imitating-yourself and Imitating-others Decisions. Stars indicate Wilcoxon Signed-Rank tests. ⋆⋆ p < . 05 and ⋆⋆⋆ p < . 01 . 
mann, Oechssler, 1999 ), which confirms our previous results and shows that both myopic best reply and imitation have a 
significant impact on decisions, with the latter having a larger relative weight. 
In summary, the regression models confirm our non-parametric analysis while controlling for other features. Taken to- 
gether, the analyses above provide strong evidence for Hypotheses (H1), (H2), (H3), and (H4a), and weak evidence for Hy- 
pothesis (H4b). Hence, we conclude that our experiment supports our model, suggesting that interacting behavioral rules 
with qualitatively different properties codetermine behavior in complex economic decisions. 
Remark 1. We have recently run a number of experiments on an unrelated research question, namely the effects (or lack 
thereof) of cognitive load ( Achtziger, Alós-Ferrer, & Ritschel ). One of the experiments in that manuscript replicates the ex- 
periment described here while manipulating cognitive load across two treatments with different subjects. Each of the two 
treatments (no load and load, N = 72 each) could be considered as a replication of the experiment in this paper. All results 
described above are confirmed in both treatments. 
5. Imitating yourself vs. imitating others 
There are two qualitatively different kinds of imitative decisions. In some cases, it might happen that the decision maker’s 
own profits in the last period were the largest observed ones. In this case, imitation actually corresponds to “imitate your- 
self,” while other imitative decisions are of the type “imitate others.” Decisions where a player imitates him- or herself 
can also be conceived of as obeying positive reinforcement , which prescribes to repeat the previous choice if the player has 
“won,” that is, obtained the maximum observed profits. This corresponds to a simple “win-stay” version of reinforcement 
learning , i.e. the tendency to repeat what has worked in the past without paying attention to whether the conditions in 
which past actions were successful have changed. Reinforcement is particularly important for economics, as it captures the 
empirically-relevant focus on past performance , whose consequences are well-documented (e.g., outcome bias; Baron and 
Hershey, 1988; Dillon and Tinsley, 2008 ). Evidence from neuroscience has shown that reinforcement learning is associated 
with extremely fast and unconscious brain responses (e.g., Schultz, 1998; Holroyd and Coles, 2002 ). In an explicitly eco- 
nomic context, Achtziger, Alós-Ferrer, 2014 showed that a simple reinforcement heuristic corresponds to a highly automatic 
process which competes with more deliberative rules when feedback comes in a win-loss frame. 
Since reinforcement is generally considered to be rather automatic, we hypothesize that “imitating yourself” should be 
associated with shorter response times than “imitating others.” Note that imitating yourself and imitating others are never 
simultaneously active processes, but rather constitute a partition of imitative decisions and hence the prediction of faster 
response times is straightforward: the process favoring imitation is faster in one case than in the other, while the competing 
myopic best reply rule remains fixed. 
Fig. 4 displays the response times of decisions where participants imitated themselves or others. For completeness, we 
disentangle the comparison according to whether imitation (or positive reinforcement) was in conflict or in alignment with 
myopic best reply. Imitating-yourself decisions in case of conflict were significantly faster than imitating-others decisions 
(average 9.48 s vs. 11.86 s, WSR, N = 16 , z = −3 . 258 , p = . 0011 ). In case of alignment, imitating-yourself decisions were 
also significantly faster than imitating-others decisions (average 9.62 s vs. 13.71 s; N = 16 , z = −2 . 947 , p = . 0032 ). Thus, we 
confirm that the imitation behavioral rule that we consider might be supported by a composite process which, in some 
cases, reflects positive reinforcement. This is of independent interest, but does not change our previous conclusions. 
Decisions following “imitating yourself” (or positive reinforcement) imply upholding the previously-selected action. 
Hence, they are aligned with a further, particularly simple behavioral rule: decision inertia , i.e. the tendency to repeat 
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Fig. 5. Average Response Times of Stay and Shift Decisions. Left: Comparison of best reply decisions in case of conflict. Right: Comparison of non-best 
replies in case of alignment. Stars indicate Wilcoxon Signed-Rank tests. ⋆⋆ p < . 05 and ⋆⋆⋆ p < . 01 . 
previous behavior independently of any feedback. This raises the natural question of whether the driver of the effects above 
is actually this simple but more general rule, i.e. whether inertia results in clear effects beyond situations where the decision 
maker has obtained the largest profits. Previous work ( Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016c ) has compared decision inertia with rein- 
forcement in the belief-updating task of Charness, Levin, 2005 and Achtziger, Alós-Ferrer, 2014 , and found that inertia does 
cause asymmetries in error rates, but this behavioral rule seems weaker than reinforcement and is typically washed away 
by it. Apesteguía et al. (2007) found that, in their Cournot-oligopoly experiment, subjects repeated their previous choice 
12% to 23% of the time (depending on treatment) when they observed a higher-payoff strategy. To see whether inertia is 
behaviorally relevant in our paradigm, we examined it in the cases where it is not aligned with imitation, since in case of 
alignment with imitation we obtain positive reinforcement. To avoid confusion, however, we reserve the words “alignment”
and “conflict” for the confluence or not of myopic best reply and imitation. In case of conflict between myopic best reply 
and imitation, we will compare “stay” myopic best replies (as prescribed by inertia) with “shift” myopic best replies. In case 
of alignment between myopic best reply and imitation, we test within other kinds of decisions not following the common 
prescription of myopic best reply and imitation. 
Fig. 5 depicts the response times of decisions in line with inertia (“stay” decisions) and those opposed to it (“shift”
decisions). For conflict, the comparison is between “stay” and “shift” best replies. There were, however, no differences in 
the response times of these two kinds of decisions (stay, average 12.19 s; shift, 12.51 s; WSR, N = 16 , z = −0 . 776 , p = 
. 4380 ). Hence, whenever myopic best reply and imitation conflict, there is no evidence of involvement of inertia (beyond 
the possible confluence with imitation), and in particular the effects of reinforcement described above are unlikely to be 
due to a more general process reflecting pure inertia. 
For alignment (between imitation and myopic best reply), we compare all non -best replies of the “stay” and “shift” forms. 
Such stay (inertia) decisions were significantly faster than the comparable shift decisions (stay, average 12.13 s; shift, 14.48 s; 
WSR, N = 16 , z = −2 . 741 , p = . 0061 ). In this case, best replies coincide with imitative decisions, that is, the “other” decisions 
we examine are not imitative, and in particular can not follow from positive reinforcement. Although this is speculative, this 
result suggest that shift decisions in this case might include choices derived from higher-order reasoning or more complex 
behavioral rules. This would be consistent with the long response times of “other” decisions under conflict discussed in the 
regression analyses in Section 4 . 
6. Conclusion 
In a Cournot oligopoly experiment designed to maximize behavioral variance (as opposed to convergence), we find clear 
evidence in favor of the presence of multiple behavioral rules, one of them being imitation of successful, observed be- 
havior. This is in line with previous experimental evidence on convergence to Walrasian outcomes in Cournot oligopolies 
( Apesteguía et al., 2010; Huck et al., 1999, 2004; Offerman et al., 2002 ), which is a prediction of models assuming imitative 
behavior ( Vega-Redondo, 1997; Alós-Ferrer and Ania, 2005 ). 
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We rely on a simple formal model where each decision maker might follow either imitation or myopic best reply. The 
model makes a number of predictions which allow us to test for the multiplicity of behavioral rules, in the sense that 
none of the predictions would hold if only one rule was present. This is possible because the predictions rely on explicit 
characteristics of the rules, in terms of their cognitive requirements. First, they rest on the ex ante classification of decisions 
in conflict or alignment according to the pre-specified rules. Second, they concern both choices and response times, the latter 
being a direct correlate of the postulated characteristics of the brain decision processes underlying the behavioral rules. 
We find a number of “smoking guns,” all predicted by our model: best replies are slower under conflict with imitation 
than under alignment (generalizing the Stroop effect from cognitive psychology), they are slower than imitative decisions 
under conflict but faster than other decisions under alignment, and both best replies and imitative decisions are less frequent 
under conflict than under alignment. The evidence is striking and systematic, and, since it is based on process data, speaks 
in favor of a literal multiplicity of competing behavioral rules in economic decision making. 
More generally, our model and empirical evidence support the view that economic decision making, even in strate- 
gic settings, might sometimes be better explained by integrating different views of behavior, instead of either assuming 
fully-rational optimization or boundedly-rational impulse-response behavior only. Multiple behavioral rules are more than a 
convenient metaphor or an as if model, and the analysis of human decisions can be improved by viewing them as the result 
of the interaction of different behavioral rules and decision processes in the human brain. 
Appendix: Proofs 
Proof of Theorem 1. The expected response time of best replies in case of alignment ( x B = x I ) is 
E(RT | x B , Alignment ) = 
(1 − ) P BR R B + P Im R I 
( 1 − ) P BR + P Im 
and the expected response time of best replies in case of conflict ( x B  = x I ) is 
E(RT | x B , Conflict ) = 
(1 − ) P BR R B + P Im B R 
I 
( 1 − ) P BR + P Im B 
. 
Then, E(RT | x B , Conflict ) > E(RT | x B , Alignment ) holds if and only if 
(
P Im − P Im B 
)
R B > 
(
P Im − P Im B 
)
R I 
which holds by (P1) and (R). 
Proof of Theorem 2. (H2) The expected response time of best replies in case of conflict ( x B  = x I ) is as given in the proof of 
Theorem 1 , and the expected response time of imitative answers is 
E(RT | x I , Conflict ) = 
(1 − ) P BR I R 
B + P Im R I 
( 1 − ) P BR I + P 
Im 
where P BR I denotes the probability with which the best reply rule selects an imitative answer when it does not coincide 
with the prescription of imitation, i.e. P BR I = P 
BR (x I ) when x B  = x I . Then, E(RT | x B , Conflict ) > E(RT | x I , Conflict ) if and only if 
(




(R B − R I ) > 0 
which holds by (R) ( R B > R I ) and (P1) (which implies P BR P Im > P BR I P 
Im 
B ). 
(H3) The expected response time of best replies in case of alignment ( x B = x I ) is as given in the proof of Theorem 1 , and 
the expected response time of other answers is 
E(RT | x  = x B , Alignment ) = 
(1 − )(1 − P BR ) R B + (1 − P Im ) R I 
(1 − )(1 − P BR ) + (1 − P Im ) 
. 
Then, E(RT | x B , Alignment ) < E(RT | x  = x B , Alignment ) if and only if 
(
(1 − P BR ) P Im − P BR (1 − P Im ) 
)
(R B − R I ) > 0 . 
Since R B > R I holds by (R), the result holds if (1 − P BR ) P Im > P BR (1 − P Im ) , which is equivalent to P Im > P BR . The latter 
holds by (P2). 
Proof of Theorem 3. (H4a) The proportion of best replies in case of alignment ( x B = x I ) is P (BR | Alignment ) = (1 − ) P BR + 
P Im , and the proportion of best replies in case of conflict ( x B  = x I ) is P (BR | Conflict ) = (1 − ) P BR + P Im B , where P 
Im 
B de- 
notes the probability with which the imitation rule selects a best reply when it does not coincide with the prescription of 
imitation, i.e. P Im B = P 
Im (x B ) when x B  = x I . Then, P (BR | Alignment ) > P (BR | Conflict ) if and only if P Im > P Im B , which holds by 
(P1). 
(H4b) is analogous to (H4a). 
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Supplementary material 
Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.12.034 
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